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PREFACE

The Nuclear War Institute held at West Baden College in November, '
....

-

1963 indicated rather forcefully that there is little dialogue between philosophers of morality and the men who are engaged i,n the more practical aspects of
politics. It cannot be said that United States policy has been formulated without ethical considerations I but I believe that most people will admit that these
considerations have not formally entered into the decisions. The effort to
relate ethical theory and political reality is a difficult problem inasmuch as it
involves the confrontation of the theoretical and practical spheres. Yet, there
are many who hold the importance of such a confrontation and would hope to
witness solutions that can be worked out in realistic terms.
Very few philosophers of morality have attempted to relate their ethical
theories to the concrete hard facts of everyday political life. One notable exception is Reinhold Niebuhr. His ability in this area has led many to regard
him as the philosopher of political realism and accounts for his importance as
an ethician. The extend, of his contribution and influence in this area is attested to by a number of men who are professionals in both the ethical and political fields.
This thesis aims primarily at showing how Dr. Niebuhr has gone about
applying an ethical theory to some aspects of United States foreign policy.
vi

\

His writings on the subjept cover a large span of years and treat such a variety
of aspects that any attempt to cover all of them would result in superficial
treatment. ConsequentlY'4 I have elected to limit the discu15sion to a few specific issues which were predominant during the time of World War U and the ye!ars
immediately following. This period has been chosen because Dr. Niebuhr's
wr:itings at this time reflect his thought in its mC3:turity. Moreover, the issues
which he discussed at this time are such that we can see rather clearly how he
went about applying his theory to the practical politics of the time.
In keeping with the aim of the thesis stated above, it seems best to
limit this work to the presentation of Niebuhr's doctrine.· An attempt to go
beyond this into evaluation and comparison would result in overextension and
superficiality. I say this for two reasons. The first is that Niebuhr's ethics of
United States foreign policy is found scattered through a number of his books
and a larger number of occasional writings

0

Even though the bulk of his

general ethical theory is found well summarized in his books, it at times becomes clear only when it is seen how it is applied. As a result it is necessary
to bring the two aspects together into a synthesis so that the practical decisiom
can be seen in light of the general theory. Secondly I the dialectical nature of
his thought demands careful and extensive synthesis.
Finally I it should be noted that there is no scarcity of secondary
sources on Niebuhr. Many of them treat of his concern for practical politics.

vii

\

However, I have not found any extensive treatment of his writings on United
States foreign policy. The unique character of this thesis I then I is that it
deals with a limited portion of the practical politics with which he concerned
himself in order that it might be seen how he applies a general ethics to parl:i-

.--

cular problems.

.

.

viii
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CHAPTER I

•

THE DEVELOPMENT OP NIEBUHR'S SOCIAL ETHICS

Any attempt to understand an individual's mature philosophical position
requires at least a general familiarity with the manner in which that position developed during the course of his philosophical career. Attention must be given
to those forces which work on the individual from outside such as his education
and the temper of the age in which he lives

0

We must also consider the de-

velopment in terms of the insights and reactions which take place within the
individual himself. This is particularly true of a man like Reinhold Niebuhr
whose interests extend in almost every direction and whose thinking has undergone several drastic changes in a relatively brief span of time. It is precisely
because of this variety of interests and the radical changes in his thinking that
the task of providing an account of background and development becomes a
difficult one. Nevertheless, various patterns and trends can be detected although the divisions and changes were never as clear-cut and abrupt as a
summary analysis might lead one to believe.
The evolution of Niebuhr's social ethics and political philosophy is
generally considered to have occurred in three major phases. The first, which
corresponds approximately to the period of the 1920's, is characterized by a
1

\

2

conventual liberalism which combines the doctrines of the Social Gospel with
~

,

I

the pragmatism of John Dewey. This trend had wide popular acceptance in the

•

United States at the time. During the period of the 1930' s, the second phase in
the development of Niebuhr's thought was to appear in the form of the acceptana::
,

..

-

of Marxist principles, although not without qualification. By approximately
1940, his mature position was beginning to take form and it is generally believec
that from this time up to the present, his position has not changed essentially
even though there have been several variations in its application. This period
witnesses a combination of pragmatism with the classical principles of western
civilization and an effort to transcend the principles of both trends.
Within this evolution, there was a development in two general areas of
application

.

0

One of these concerns the matter of socialism and all the implica-

tions connected with economic and political controls. The other treats the
question of pacifism and includes the entire discussion concerning the use of
violent and non-violent resistance.
Now that we have seen the general outline of the evolution of Niebuhr's
thought, we are in a position to examine each of the stages more closely in
order to obtain insight into his mature ethical position. The Social Gospel
doctrine which formed one of the two maj or elements of Niebuhr's thought in the
1920's was largely influenced by Walter Rauschenbusch who was its most
important theologian. The theory put forth by Rauschenbusch was that the conI

cept of the Kingdom of God is the central approach for both religion and society.

\

3
."

,The Kingdom came to

b~

identified with a gradual growth in the perfeotion of

laws, customs, institutions of education, and everything else that comprised

•
the collective life of humanity. The manner in which this aim was to be effected was through faith and through
knowledge which consists in a scientific
.. ,

comprehension of social life. It is true that Rauschenbusch did not think that
the Kingdom of God could be established on earth in its fullness because he
knew that social change would not abolish the sinfulness of man. But many of
his followers differed from him on this point and fully expected to see the establishment of the Kingdom of God in history. For them, the Kingdom of God
thus became synonomous \yith historical progress. Egoism and power would not
destroy the progress provided that human relations would be controlled by love,
that a policy of non-violence would be established in politic'll relfltfnnR.
Wid i.

paCifism would. prevail in international relations.

i'lnd

1

The other major influence during this early period was the social application of the instrumentalist version of American pragmatism associated with
John Dewey. This was based on the theory that social change could be effected
by means of education and experiment. It was felt that the only factor which
prevented social progress was ignorance and consequently "science and.
1Arthur Schlesinger, Ir., "Reinhold Niebuhr's Role in American
Political Thought and Life," Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and
Political Thought, ed. Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York:
Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 127-28.

\

4

education were looked upon as the tools for working out the .great eoonomio and
political issues.

2

'

•
In 1936, Niebuhr published an-article in which he enumerated a set of
propositions that characterize the conventual liberalism of the early period.
,4;-

a. That injustice is caused by ignorance and will yield to education
and greater intelligence.
b. That civilization is becoming gradually more moral and that it is a
sin to challenge either the inevitability or the efficacy of gradualness.
c. That the character of individuals rather than social systems and
arrangements is the guarantee of justice in society.
d. That appeals to love, justice, good-will and brotherhood are
bound to be efficacious in the end. If they have not been so to date we
must have more appeals to love, justice, good-will and brotherhood.
e. That goodness makes for happiness and that the increasing knowledge of this fact wil~ overcome human selfishness ,and greed.
f. That wars are stupid and can therefore only be caused by p~ople
who are more stupid than those who recognize the stupidity of war.
The transiti.on

of 'f\Ti c.t-..l!hr' s

';v-.;;~l va .It:) WdY ell: Lilt: L.i.m~ tllat

thought

1nh +11;:>

he wrote the article

;,"\('!ond major phase was
~rom

which we have just.

quoted. His dissatisfaction with liberalism rested on the fact that its creed
blinds it to the real world. This dissatisfaction was foreshadowed by an
earlier insight which made a distinction between what he called the "prophet"
and the "statesman."

4

The prophet, for him, was the man committed to God

while the statesman was the man committed to the sinful world. _This
2 Ibid • , pp. 129-30.
3Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Blindness of Liberalism," Radical Religion,
I, No.4 (Autumn, 1936), p. 4.
4Reinhold Niebuhr, Leaves from the Notebook of ~ Tamed Cynic (New
York: Willett, Clark, and Colby Co., 1929), PP. xii-xiv.

\

5
distinction gave rise to a certain opposition which he felt existed between the
Social Gospel and pragmatism. Instead of being fused into one as the liberal

•
creed presupposed, these two streams seemed to be a paradox. The Social
Gospel lacked the sense of the re1.Citive since it placed its emphasis on the
law of love. Pragmatism, on the other hand, lacked a sense of the absolute
because of its insistence that expert knowledge could overcome all difficulties.
Niebuhr's solution to the problem appeared on two levels. On the level of
strategy, he prescribed the balance of power; on the level of tactics, his
answer was found in adherence to Marxist principles 05
At this point, we find Niebuhr in the second phase of the evolution of
his thought. Although it is true that he never felt completely at ease about
accepting the Marxist princioles in their entirety / he did subscribe to them
quite extensively and they did influence his thinking profoundly.·

In.

Idt:;a~rdl,

it might be said that the defects of the liberal philosophy seemed to be the
strength of Marxism. Kenneth Thompson describes these as follows:
Liberalism had failed to relate the individual organically to society;
Marxism made society the beginning and the end. Liberalism maintained
that the individual through maximizing self-interest would miraculously
serve the interests of all; Marxism showed that this was in practical terms
5Sc hlesinger, .QJ2.. cit., po 136.
6Kenneth Thompson I liThe Political Philosophy of Reinhold Niebuhr I II
Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social and Political Thought, ed. Charles W.
Keg ley and Robert w. Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co 0, 1956). p. 159.

\

6

a middle-class idealogy. Liberalism concealed the conflicts of interest
which prevail in all communities: Marxism laid bare the struggles which
went on betwe'en diverse social and economic classes. Liberalism insisted that justice could be attained through the automatic working of a
free economic system: Marxism proclaimed that injustice was inevitable
as long as economic inequality prevailed. 7
•
It can be seen that Marxism dominated Niebuhr's thought during this
period, but it must be pOinted out that his allegiance was always strictly limited
He saw that the Communists made two basic errors. The first was that they
found the Kingdom of God in history. Although he liked their emphasis on the
collective aspect of man's existence, he feared that it was culminating in a
secular religion. The Communists, he insisted, perceived the Soviet Union as
the incarnation of the absolute. His other basic objection centered around his
theory of power. While he liked the Marxist socialization of the economy, he
, foared that the power which it sought to balance would simply

L~~

;.;;', , .);,..att.d in a

new disproportion. 8
Before we go on to consider the third and final stage in the development
of Niebuhr's thought, we must consider the influence of liberalism and
Marxism on his later thinking. Kenneth Thompson addresses himself to this
qUestion and points out that Niebuhr retained certain perennial truths inherent
in liberalism and Marxism as he embarked on his mission of discovering a
viable theory of politics, but he stripped them of their worst fantasies. In
7 Ibid., p. 1580
8Schlesinger, QQ.. cit., pp. 139-40.

"

7

looking at the elements of liberalism which endured in Niebuhr's thought, he
says:

..

Liberalism, for example, provides certain moral objectives which serve as
the gentle civilizers of politi6s in our society. Together they make up ,
what Niebuhr calls the spirit Q£..liberalism, which is older than bourgeois
culture. They include a spirit of tolerance and fairness without which life
is reduced to an almost consistent inhumanity. Freedom or liberty is
another moral and political objective which the spirit, if not the middleclass ap~lication and interpretation, of liberalism bequeths to Niebuhr's
thought
0

.

.

He goes on to say that Niebuhr rej ected Marxism more completely and more
emphatically than liberalism but it remains at least a residual element of his
approach

0

Thompson suggested that there are three insights from Marxist

thought which appear to endure

0

These are summarized as follows:

The three insights from Marxist thought
include its emphasis on the
social dimension of life and the collective fate of man' s existence which
for Niebuhr implies a responsibility to seek justice at the national and international level. He adds, however, that these organic forms of life will
not yield to the efforts of collectivists or idealists to coerce them into new
mechanical or artificial molds. Second, Marxism requires that the political
and economic structure of human communities be taken seriously. It
rej ects the belief that structures are of no importance so long as good men
.operate these systems and structures. Third, as against the liberal concept of an easy harmony of interests,Marxism postulates the idea of class
struggle. Niebuhr finds this last idea unacceptable unless expanded to
embrace all political struggles which endlessly go on as the sole means of
righting t~e balance between the victims and the beneficiaries of
injustice. 0
. .
.
.
0

9

0

•

.
Thompson, .2.2.. cit., po 162.

lOIbid.

..

\

. 8
As Niebuhr's thought began to pass from the second phase of its
development, another aspect of Marxist philosophy began to trouble him, He

•

saw that the Marxist conception of the nature of man as a being who would be

,
transfigured
with the withering away- of the state was unrealistic. To him, this
.
notion was as utopian as the sentimentality of liberalism 11 Throughout his
0

entire career, the problem of the nature of man was basic for him. His
thinking on the subject underwent an evolution as it did on the other issues and
was finally presented in its mature form in his book, The Nature and Destiny of
Man,12 which was a revised version of the Gifford Lectures which were given
at the University of Edinburgh in 1939

0

According to John C. Bennett, the

chapter entitled liThe Kingdom of God and the Struggle for Justice II which appears
in the second volume of that book represents the continuing structure of his
social ethics as well as anything that he has written .13 An understanding of
Niebuhr's concept of the nature of man is an essential prerequisite to the
proper understanding of his social ethics.
l1Ibido, p. 160.
12Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, Vol. I: Human Nature, 1941; Vol. II: Human Destiny,
1943; one-volume edition, 1949).
13John Co Bennett, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Social Ethics, II Reinhold
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought ed. Charles W.
Kegley and Robert Wo Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), po 47.
I

\

9

Before we consider the various aspects of Niebuhr' 8 mature ethical
position in detail, We must note two characteristics of his thought. First,

..

there exists a certain dialectical structure in his thinking. This is most apparent in his books where he puts forth his theories in detail. The result of
,

..

-

this is that there is frequently some ambiguity as to where he is placing his
emphasis. This ambiguity can be resolved only by an analysis of his concrete
decisions for action which can be found chiefly in his numerous articles and
editorials.
The other characteristic concerns his attitude toward the modern scientific method. Niebuhr

ad~its

that "modern social and psychological sciences

have been able to teach us a great deal about man and his community."
j'''' -

~ ...

",,("'>

time, however, he recognizes their limitattcll''I

have been

I.

~,,:1~('\~ 1;.,., ...... ,.~

14

At

that they

singularly Jd:.61el1t in generating wisdom in human affairs. ,,15 He

elaborates on his position When he says: "What is insufferable is that elaborate
claims should be made for the resources of 'science' in the clarification of our
perplexities, when it is obvious that a most rigorous application of the
methods of science means a denial of everything which is characteristically
human. ,,16

14Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 3.
15Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Tyranny of Science, " Theology Today, X,
No o 4 (January, 1954), p. 465.
16Ibid.

I

p. 471 •
\

\

."

10

'.

Those things which Niebuhr specifically objects to in the modern

~cientific method have been lined up by Kenneth Thompson as five illusions or
•
fantasies. The first is the myth of a presuppositionless science. Another is
that science tends to conceal conglusions which fail to conform to the facts. A
third illusion is that the position of the observer differs in physical and social
science. In the latter, man is both the agent and the observer. The problem,
however, is less acute when the observer is removed from his subject in time
and place as in historical studies. The fourth illusion of the scientific
approach results from modern conceptions of causation and prediction. Both
the complexity of causatiQn and the intervention of contingent factors in history
are ignored. Furthermore, prediction is possible only in terms of rough prol)"'l,n~H"C],

TriP

fin·~l

illusion is also the most persff!t""J"I+.

"11 ~(')

frr>quently,

science is considered to offer the most profound method because it is the
latest fruit of culture .17
Yet, in spite of his disavowal of the exclusive use of the scientific
method, Niebuhr does see its value and always insists on the considerations
of political realities. Furthermore, his thinking is filled with many profound
practical insights. He realizes the importance of an empirical approach along
with a more philosophical one because he realizes that ideological sentiments
can frequently influence judgments. Perhaps it is the curious and somewhat
17Thompson,.QI?. cit., pp. 153-55.

\

11
unique combination of philosophical understanding and' historical realism that
ha's earned for him widespread acclaim as America' s foremost political philo so-

•
pher. He is constantly praised for the relevance of his thought while most
political philosophers are

criticize~_ severely

for their lack of relevance. That

this is particularly true with respect to United States foreign policy can be attested by the words of Ernest W. Lefever:

II

There' has been very little serious

writing which explicitly relates Judaeo-Christian ethics to the formulation and
conduct of United States foreign policy. The many books and articles written
by Reinhold Niebuhr over the past three decades are the major exception. 1118
It is against this bapkground of the first two phases of the development

of Niebuhr ' s thought and general characteristics which illumine the nature of
his thinking that his mature philosophical position must be viewed. The next
step, then, is to consider his views on human nature as they apply to the establishment of the foreign policy ethic.

18Ernest W. Lefever, Ethics and United States Foreign Policy (New
York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1957), p. 181.

CHAPTER II

•
THE FOUNDATION OF NIEBUHR'S ETHICS

.-The foundation of Niebuhr's social ethics is found in his understanding
of human nature. Much of his writing has been devoted to this topic. Almost
every one of his books takes up the question in one form or another and each
treatment brings out a new emphasis or new aspect while at the same time remaining true to the fundamental concept. Consequently, we shall begin this
treatment by considering those aspects which are especially relevant to his
general social ethics as well as his application to the ethics of United States
, foreiO''''. noHcy.

Niebuhr's concept of the nature of man begins with man' s individuality.
"Individuality, " he· says, "is a fruit of both nature and spirit. "IOn the level
of nature, one individual is separated from another by virtue of a physical
organism which maintains its discrete existence and has its particular history.
But man's genuine individuality is the product of the spirit. "Nature supplies
the particularity but the freedom of the spirit is the cause of real individuality.,,2
1 Niebuhr,

Hu~an Nature, po 54.

2Ibid 0, p. 55.

,.
12
\

13
Man, according to Niebuhr, is distinguished from animals because of his
capacity to transcend himself. In other words, man not only has a center

•
within himself, but he also has a center beyond himself. Consequently,
Niebuhr distinguishes spirit,

whi~h.

is man's unique capacity for self-

transcendence, from soul, which man shares with animals. From this capacity
for self-transcendence arises man I s fundamental freedom which allows him to
choose, develop, and shape history.
Niebuhr describes or defines the uniqueness of the human self by emphasizing the three dialogues in which this self is involved. He shows .that
lithe self is a creature which is in constant dialogue with itself, with its
neighbors, and with God, according to the Biblical viewpoint. ,,3 An examination of each of these dialogues will serve to clarify some aspects of the nature
of man.
Niebuhr asserts that it is a matter of experienoe which all must admit
that man is a creature' engaged in a continuous internal dialogue. This internal
dialogue is something which is peculiar to the human creature. In this process,
the self approves or disapproves its actions, it judges and excuses, it pities
and glorifies. The self in which this dialogue is carried on 1s not the
"rational" self in contrast to the IIsensibleli self. There are not two distinct
selves but merely two different dimensions of the same self. This dialogue
3Reinhold Niebuhr, The futl!. and the Dramas of History (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 4.
\

.

14

within the self proceeds' on a number of different levele. Niebuhr lilt. them
as follows:

•
Sometimes it is a dtalogue between the self as engaged in its various responsibilities and affections and the self which observes these engagem~nts
Sometimes the dialogue is be1;Ween the self in the grip of its immediate
necessities and biological urges I and the self as an organization of longrange purposes and ends •. Sometimes the dialogue is between the self in
the c.ontext of one set of loy~lties and the I?elf in the grip of contrasting
claims and responsibilities
0

The setting of this dialogue is the whole s.elf which includes both man's nature
and his spirit as we described them above. It is necessary to keep this duality
in mind. It is in the context of this organic unity of the self and its functions
and the freedom and transcendence of the self over its functions that this internal dialogue takes. place.
The second dialogue of the self is that which takes place constantly
with man's various neighbors. "This may be a quality which Aristotle was
<.-;.:, .. 1.... ,)/

.J.escriolng by detining

ti&t~ ~elf

as a

~

politicon. but that definition

would not do justice to the endless nuances and levels of the dialogue of the
self with others. ,,5 The reason for this is that the self "is not merely dependent
on others for its sustenance and security. It is dependent upon them for the
image which it has of itself and for the spiritual security which is as necessary
to the self as its social security ... 6
4

Ibid. I p. 7.

5Ibid. I p. 4.

6 Ibid ., p. 4-5.
\

15
In the dialogue \vith others, there are certain conditions which Niebuhr
discusses and which can be enumerated briefly. (1) "The self faces the other
7self as a mystery which can never be fully penetrated." (2) "The self sees
the other as an instrument for its purposes and as a.completion for its incompleteness • ,,8 (3) "The self cannot be truly fulfilled if it is not drawn out of
itself into the life of the other. ,,9 (4) "The seif recognizes the other as the
limit of its expansiveness. ,,10 (5)

"The uniqueness of the individuals which

enter into any dialogic relation makes' each one of these relations highly unique
however general may be the natural basis of the relation. 1111 (6) "While the
self is a unique center of life it is indeterminately lopenl to other selves. 1112
(7)

liThe pattern of these dialogues is conditioned by historic factors. 1113
liThe selfis physical and spiritual need of others is naturally satisfied

not only in casual and transient but in permanent relationship. II
7Ibid ., p. 30.
8 Ibid. , p. 31.
9 Ibid. ,
10 Ibid ., p. 32.

IIIb'd
_1_., p. 33.
12 Ibid

~

13 Ib1d

----!

14 Ib1d , , p, 34.

\

14

Thus, the

jO

16
dialogue with others

gi'fe~

rise tO,and inClude,s man's

com~nitie ••

There il •

twofold relationship of ~e individual to the community. l'lie vertical dimension ,
t
I

~

•

of this relationship can!be further divided into two forms • Man "looks up at the '
!

.

,

'

,

community as the fulfillment of his
,- life and the sustainer of his existence. By
its organization his phy'sical and moral needs are met. ,,15 Niebuhr describes
the nature of this form of the vertical dimension in tile following way:
The individual is related to the community (in its various levels and extensions) in such a way that the highest reaches of his individuality are
dependent upon the social substance out of which they arise and they must
find their end and fulfillment in community. No simple limit can be. placed
upon the degree of intimacy to the. community and t~e breadth and extent of
community which the individual requires for life,. 1
.

.

The second form of the vertical dimension is the view that the individual takes.
when he looks down on the community "because he is, as it were, higher than
it. It is bound to nature more inexorably than he. It knows nothing of a dimension of the eternal beyond its own existence. ',,17 Consequently, the

com~unity

tenaciously clings to life and is often willing to sacrifice every dignity t<? preserve its existence. The other dimension of the individual's relationship to the
15Ibid., p. 35.
16Reinhold Niebuhr I The Children of Light and !!l.!! Children of Darkness
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 48 •

•

17 Niebuhr, The Self and ~' Dramas of History I p. 35.
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community is the horizontal one which he "experiences

• • •• whenever his

community is in conflict with other communities. 1118

•

The third dialogue, which is the· dialogue with· God, reveals the self

,

in its ultimate search for meaning •.~_This search takes many forms, but Niebuhr
feels that it is possible to place them into three general categories. "The
first category embraces all religious responses in which the self seeks to
break through a universal rational system in order to assert its significance ultimately. ,,19 It may do this individually or in the assertion of the significance
of the collective self. In the latter case, the individual is so conscious of his
finiteness that he can only find significance in the community. The second
category is generally defined as IImysticism" and stands at the opposite pole of
idolatry. "It is • • • a,n heroic effort to transcend all finite values and systems
of meaning, including the' self as particular existence and to arrive at
universality and 'unconditioned' being. ,,20 The third

t',.', ' "'i ' ,

faiths of Judaism and Christianity. "These faiths interpret the self's
experience with the ultimate in the final reaches of its self-awareness as a
dialogue with God. This idea of a dialogue between the self and God assumes
the personality of God. • • '... 21 In describing this category, Gordon Harland
18 Ibid ., p. 38.
19

Ibid., p. 63.

.

20 Ibid., p. 64.
2 1Ibid. ,

,,

I

I

I

I
i

18
summarizes Niebuhr's thinking On the matter as tollows:
In this dialogue man is convicted not for his finiteness but for his sin, and
he is convicted by a love that has the power not onll' to convict but also to
uphold and redeem. In this dialogue he learns that the attempt to seek the
fulfillment of the ~lf from the standpoint of the .self are both idolatrous
and self-defeating; that the self can find fulfillment only when centered in
God; and that this ~ban be found not when self-fUlfillment is sought as the
conscious end but for the glory of God only. 22
I

We have already seen that man's capacity for self-transcendence is
closely associated with his freedom. A further examination of this freedom is
necessary for a proper understanding of Niebuhr's concept of the nature of man
and his social ethics.
Man's freedom enables him to rise above purely natural process. In
Christian Realism and Political Problems, Niebuhr writes:
According to the Christian view, the human self arises as an independent
and self-determining force in the very social process and historical continuum in which it is also a creature. Its freedom is a radical one because
the self i~ not easily kept within the confines of nature's harmonies. This
freedom is ~he basis of the self's destructive as well as creatj.ve powers;
and there is no simple possibility of ma~dng nice distinctions between
.
human destructiveness and creativity. 2
And ih The Self 2.ru! the Dramas of History, he puts this same notion into a
slightly different perspective:
22Gordon Harland, ~ Thought 2! Reinhold Niebuhr (New York:
,Oxford University Press I 1960), p. 62.
23Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems P. 6.
Cf. also: Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness I
Pp. 59-60.
I

i
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It is obvious that ~e self's freedom over natural proces.s enables it to be

a creator of historidal events. Both its memory of past events and its
capacity to proj ect goals transcending the necessities of nature enable it
to create the new level of reality which we know as htmlan history. But
the self is not simply a creator of this new dimension, for it is also a
creature of the web of events, in the creation of which it participates. 24
Here Niebuhr squarely faces the co~troversy between voluntarism and determinism. He considers three elements:nature,

r~ason,

and history. In refuSing

to admit that nature, reason, and history strictly determine man's activity, he
is not so naive as to fail to recognize their influence on man's actions. All
three elements condition and in some respects limit what man will do. Consequently, he views man as a basically free creature whose activity is

.

influenced by nature, reason, and the historical context in which he finds
himself •
From the foregoing, we can put together most of the elements in
Niebuhr's concept of the essential nature of man. He summarizes it as follows:
The essential nature of man contains two elements; and there are correspondingly two elements in the original perfection of man. To the essential
nature of man belong, on the one hand, all his natural endowments and
determinations, his physical and social impulses, his sexual and racial
differentiations, in short his character as a creature imbedded in the
natural order. On the other hand, his essential nature also includes the
freedom of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally
his self-transcendence. 25
Thus, man's essential nature contains two contradictory elements: finiteness
24Niebuhr, The Self and the DramC?- of History, p. 41.
25Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 270.

\
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and freedom. But, it must be noted that man never really attatns the fullness
,of his essential nature ~ There is a difference between what man is essentially
:~md

what he is in the e*istential order of things.

•

The basis of the contradiction between essential man and existential
,,~-

man is found in the two components of man I s nature • Man I s finiteness is the
occasion for his sin. This happens in three ways. First, "man is insecure and
involved in natural contingency; he seeks to overcome his insecurity by a willto-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness ... 26 Moreover,
"man is ignorant and involved in the limitations of a finite mind; but he pretends
that he is not limited ... 27 . In these two cases, sin becomes identified with
pride. In the third case, "man seeks to solve the problem of the contradiction
of finiteness and freedom, not by seeking to hide his finiteness and comprehending the world into himself, but by seeking to hide his freedom and by
losing himself in some aspect of the world's vitalities.

'-'u

In this situation,

II-

Niebuhr would call the sin sensuality rather than pride.
But Niebuhr insists that the uniqueness of the Biblical approach to the
human problem lies in its subordination of the problem of finiteness to the
problem of sin. We have already indicated that finiteness is only the occasion
2 6Ibid ., p. 178:
27 Ibid ., pp~ 178-79.

.

,

2 8 Ibid., p. 179.
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tor sin. liThe contrast between what man is truly and essentially and what he
has become is apparent:, even to those who do not

\

und~rstand
"

that this contrast

•
l,S to be found in every human b,eing and has its seat in the will of man

,

himself .11 29 It is the freedom of man's will which has been corrupted by origina
",-

sin that makes it possible for man to sin. This position has been summarized
as follows:
The will is bound. It is not bound by fate or by creation. It is bound to
the interests of the self which, in contradiction to its essential nature,
seeks the things of the self for the sake of the self and thus deepens the
alienation of the self from its true self. Nor can the will so bound, unwill
its condition by willing. The condition must be restored. That the condition is restored through the person, work, and promise of Jesus Christ
is the message of the. Christian faith. 30
In summary, then, we see that man's failure to achieve the fullness of
his essential nature is, according tq Niebuhr, the result of the corruption of
his freedom of will through original sin. In addition, the element of finiteness
in the essential nature of man produces the insecurity which Is the occasion for
the individual to choose freely in contradiction to the law which his essential
nature gives to him. Now that we have viewed both the essential and existential aspects of the nature of man, we are in a position to examine the law or
norm of morality which arises out of man's nature and governs it.
Niebuhr tells us that lIit is important to distinguish between the essen29

Ibid., p.265 •.

30Harland, Q1?.. cit., pp. 79-80.
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tial nature of man and

1:h,~

virtue and perfection which would represent the

normal expression of that nature. ,,31 We will recall that there are two elements

•
in this essential nature. The first is man's finiteness and the virtue and perfection which corresponds to it is ,-usually designated as the natural law. "It
is the law which defines the proper peIiormance of his functions, the normal
harmony of his impulses and the normal social relation between himself and his
fellows within the limitations of the natural order. ,,32 The second element in
man's essential nature is his freedom of spirit and the virtues which correspond
to it "are analogous to the 'theological' virtues of Catholic thought, namely
faith, hope, and love. ,,33 ~Niebuhr validates these as basic requirements of
man's freedom as follows:
Faith in the providence of God is a necessity of freedom because, without
it the anxiety of freedom tempts man to seek a self-sufficiency and selfmastery incompatible with his dependence upon forces which he does not
control. Hope is a particular form of that faith. It deals with the
future
Love is both an independent requirement of this same freedom and a
derivative of faith Love is a requirement of freedom because the community to which man is impelled by his social nature is not possible to him
merely upon the basis of his 'gregarious impulse
Since men are
separated from one another by the uniqueness and individuality of each
spirit, however closely they may be bound together by ties of nature, they
cannot relate themselves to one another in terms which will do justice to
0

•

0

•

0

0

•

•

•

31Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 270.
32 Ibid •
33 Ib
'd
_1_0' p. 271.
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both the bonds of nilture and the freedom of their .p1tit 1f thoy atl not r'@.
lated in terms of love. • • • This "I" and "Thou II relationship is impossible .
without the presupposition of faith for two reasons: (1) Without freedom
from anxiety man is so enmeshed in the vicious circle·of egocentricity, so
concerned about himself, that he cannot release himself for the adventure
of love. (2) Without relation to God, the world of freedom in which spirit
must meet spirit is so obscured that human beings constantly sink to the
level of things in the human imagination. 34
Prom the foregoing, we can see that love is the norm of human nature.
It is a love based on faith and not unrelated to hope. Niebuhr explicitly states
that this is the norm when he says that lithe law of his (i. e ., man I s) nature is love, a harmonious relation of life to life in obedience to the divine center and
source of his life. ,,35 Later on, he even goes further when he says that "love
is • • • the end term of any system of morals. It is the moral requirement in

.

which all schemes of justice are fulfilled and negated. "

36

Now that we have seen that Niebuhr's primary ethical norm is the law of
love, we must examine the details and meaning of this ucrrn.. IL.:; tells us: lilt
contains three terms: (a) the perfect relation of the soul to God in which
obedience is transcended by love, trust, and confidence ••• ; (b) the perfect internal harmony of the soul with itself in all of its desires and impulses;
and (c) the perfect harmony of life with life: • • • • "37 But, he also distin34 Ibid ., pp. 271-72.
35 Ibid., p. 16.
3 6 Ibid., p. 295.
37 Ibid ., pp. 288-89.
\
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guishes between agape irhich is the heedless, self-forgetful, and self.

r

sacrificing love
of Christ in the New Testament and mutual love
in which the
,
.
\

,

•

concern of one person fQr the interests· of another prompts and elicits a recipro,
cal affection. Niebuhr says in Christian Realism and Political Problems that
these two kinds of love cannot be divided by any neat line. 38 Nevertheless,
the distinction is of considerable importance in the development of his ethical
theory. It can be understood best if we study the relationship that exists
between them.
Niebuhr constantly refers to this relationship as paradoxical. Sacrificial love is an act in history. At the same time, it must transcend history.
Sacrificial love cannot justify itself in history because the self-realization of
each individual depends upon the reciprocal affection of mutual love and because conflicting social demands are satisfied only in mutual love. "Mutual
love and loyalty are, in a sense, the highest possibilities of social
life, •••• ,,39 But, the kind of self-giving which has self-realization as its
result must not have self-realization as its consciOUS end; otherwise the self
by calculating its 'engagement will not escape from itself completely enough to
be enlarged."

40

Thus we see that "from the standpoint of history mutual love

38Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 160.
39 Niebuhr , Paith and History, p.18S.
40Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems

I.

I

p. 141.
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is the highest good" but "mutuality is not a possible achievement if it is made

I

the intent1.on and

go~l

.

of tinY action. ,,41 Consequently, mutual love needs sac~

rificial love in order for i.t to remain mutual love. In view of this, Niebuhr can

,

c~ll the sacrificial love ~gape) oLthe New Testament "the support of all
historical ethics. ,,42
The sacrificial love which we have been considering has a threefold
relation of transcendence to mutual love

0

First, agape "completes the incom-

pleteness of mutual love (eros), for the latter is always arrested by the fact
that it seeks to relate life to life from the standpoint of the self and for the sake
of the self's own happiness. ,,43 Second, "the Cross represents a transcendent
perfection which clarifies obscurities of history and defines the limits of what
is possible in historic development. ,,44 Niebuhr then goes on to show that the
final justification of agape is never found in history because of the necessity of
mutuality. Thus, even though agape always remains the norm, it is also true
that no decision can simply conform to agape. This is the paradox which we
discussed above. Finally, the third relation of transcendence is that lithe
41 Nie buhr, Human Destiny, Pp. 68-69.
42 Ibid ., p. 69.

43 Ibid ., p. 82.
44 IbiQ.., p. 86.
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'

"

Cross represents a perfeption which contradicts the false pretensions of virtue
in history and which reveals
, the contrast between manls sinful self-assertion

•

apd the divine agape .,,48

-

Before we can coinplete the.. picture containing the chief positive ele'~.

,

ments in Niebuhr l s ethical scheme, we must consider the notion of justice
which he sets up as a correlative of agape.

He does not attempt a

definition of

justice because, for him, justice has no independent basis. Rather, it is a relational term and has meaning only in connection with agape. It is the embodiment of agape in the structures of society. 46 The relationship is a dialectical
one analogous to the relati9n of mutual love and sacrificial love. 47 It must be
considered from both aspects: the relation of love to justice and the relation of
justice to love.
The relationship of love to justice is such that it both fulfills and
negates justice. 48 Niebuhr tells us that love fulfills justice "because the obUgation of life to life is more fully met in love than is possible in any scheme of
equity and justice. ,,49 It negates justice "because love makes an end of the
45Ibid., p. 89.
46 Harland, .QE.. cit ! I p. 2 3 •
47Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 247.
48Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 295. Cf. also: Niebuhr, Paith and
History, p. 193.
49Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 295.
\
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nicely calculated less and more of structures of Justice p It .,does not carefully
arbitrate between the needs of the self and of the other since it meets the

•
.
50
needs of the other without concern for the self 0"
The higher possibilities
of love always stand over every system of justice.
When it comes to relating justice to love,. the basic relationship is not
changed, but the relationship, viewed in this way, does take on a new perspective. The complexities of this relationship must be viewed in two dimensions. One is the dimension of the rules and laws of justice while the other
is the dimension of the structures of justice. The difference between them is
that the former deals with an abstraction: the latter with the embodiment of
justice in history. 51 The rules and laws of justice have both a positive and
negative element in their relation to love. Positively, "they extend the sense
of obligation toward the other, (a) from an immediately felt obligation,
prompted by obvious need, to a continued obligation expn;s:::;c'-':... fIXed principIes of mutual support; (b) from a simple relation between a self and one
lother l to the complex relations of the self and the 'others:' and (c) finally
from the obligations discerned by the individual self, to the wider obligations
which the community defines from its more impartial perspective. ,,52
50 Ibid •
51Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 247.
52 Ibid ., p. 251.

,,
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¥egatively, "they are merely approximations in so far as justioe presuppose. a
tendency of various 'men}bers of a community to take advantage of each other, or
,

I

to be more concerned with their own weal than with that of- 6thers. ,,53
In summary, then, we see that the maj or elements in Niebuhr's ethical
system consist in three analogous pairs of concepts based on the fundamental
duality in the makeup of man. This duality has 'been described in terms of
nature and spirit. All of these pairs has two characteristics in common. First,
each pair is composed of terms which are dialectically and somewhat ,
paradoxically related. Second, there is a term in each pair which corresponds
to the spiritual element inI?an' s makeup. This term always stands in such a
relationship to its mate that it includes it while at the same time it transcends
it. These pairs correspond to three aspects of man's activity: its source, the
activity itself, and its result or achievement. The first pair which deals with
the source of man I s activity describes' his nature in terms of his existential
nature and his essential nature which we considered from various aspects. The
second pair is that of mutual love and sacrificial love and involves the activity of the human individual. Man's achievement is considered in the third
pair which consists of justice, on the one hand, and agape on the other. It Is
within this framework that Niebuhr's social ethics forms.
At this point, it seems necessary to consider just what ethics means to

53 Ibid ., pp. 251-52.

29

"

Niebuhr. From our pre~ous considerations, it might seem that his ethios has a
i

predominantly theologicbl
foundation. Certainly it has a theological influence.
(\

•

In a recent article, Danl Rhoade~ describes the manner in which Niebuhr's
ethics arises out of theOlogy and political analysis. He gives an account of
Niebuhr's basic theology by saying that disinterestedness or selflessness is the
absolute ideal and that devotion to it is the essence of the Christian faith. 54
He goes on to say that Niebuhr is confronted with the fact that egOism (a condition in which man's higher capacities are limited because of human finitude)
and egotism (unfaith, distrust, and unbelieving pride) are existent in the world
and are heightened on the .collective level. At the same time, Niebuhr
realizes that the strategy of calling upon reason and religious devotion to overcome egoism and egotism in the political arena is impractical

55
0

It is against

this background that Rhoades shows the nature of Niebuhr· s ethics. Theology
lays down the absolute norms and determines that his basic method will be
teleological. His political analysis is controlled by his theology in that it is
restructed to explaining the heightened forms of egOism and egotism, which
are antitheses of his absolute norm, on the collective level. From his
political analysis comes the utilitarian aspect of Niebuhr's ethics. In other
54 Dan Rhoades, "The Prophetic Insight and Tht'0I't... ti.:'~:-k;.~:y!.i .."".,:
Inadequacy ci 'Christian Re-alism# 1M !",,':'~: ..."'$# L\'''\.'Y ('-'"\.. . :"'. . ~,,·r .. !..~~-{ .. .t.~. J.

55 Ibid ., pp. 3-5.

,
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words, his ethics is mo~e concerned with immediate qonsequences than with
absolute ends even tho~h the absolute ideal remains: in judgment upon each

I
I

I
I

•

particular act. As a result, lithe ethics deals with the polarity between the
:
56
idea and the 'real. III
I

i

I

The question of the place of theology in Niebuhr's ethics has relevance
in accordance with the purpose of this thesis only insofar as it clarifies the
question of what Niebuhr himself was trying to do. Consequently, the Rhoades
analysis has not been introduced for discussion in itself. Onels inclination to
agree or disagree with this opinion would depend on his own views of philosophy and theology. I submit that Niebuhr himself would not agree with the
Rhoades analysis even though it probably represents what most other men would
think on the subj ect.
Niebuhr does not seem to be at all interested in the question of philosophy versus theology. Rather, his whole approach

sel:..:u~

tv be an attempt to

disregard these categories and present a view of the nature of man and morality
which comprises the totality of manls nature as. a limited being who at the same
time transcends these limits. These can be seen from the manner in which he
describes the fundamental duality in manls makeup which we have just considered. He also brings this out when, in speaking of the Origin of the norm of
morality, he says: "The

~thics

of the Cross, therefore, clarifies I but does

5 6Ibid. I p. 4.

'.
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not create, a norm which is given by the very constitution of selfhood. ,,57
That Niebuhr'seems to be aiming at avoiding the traditional distinction
•
between philosophy and theology can be further seen by considering his
frequent attacks on Catholic

natur~!

law theory. In general, these attacks

have centered around two poles. The first, which is relevant to our present
consideration of the relation between philosophy and theology, deals with the
distinction between reason and faith or the natural and the supernatural.
Niebuhr looks upon the Thomistic scheme as dividing a coherent whole into a
"two-story world with a classical base and a Christian second story • .,58 The
second area of attack is the alleged failure of Thomistic natural law ethics to
take into account the contingencies of history. We will consider this aspect
later when we take up the question of the application of his general ethical
theory.
The basic pOint of difference between Niebuhr's position and natural
law ethics is, according to Niebuhr, the latter's unbounded confidence in
human reason. He interprets Catholic doctrine as holding that fallen man lacks
the capacity for the relation of communion with God in faith I hope, and love
while at the same time insisting that man's reason and capacity for natural
justice were not seriously impaired as a result of original sin. 59 Niebuhr
57 Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, p. 232.
58Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 189.
59 Niebuhr , Human Nature, p. 281.

,
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feels that this distinction between the natural and the supernatural or between
reason and faith

indicat~s

a lack of appreciation of the finiteness of man's

.'

reason. The result is that man is defined as a rational creature and the indeterminate relations of the individual to himself, to his fellow-men, and to God
are viewed as a donum superadditumo 60 Niebuhr's position, on the other hand,
attempts to unite, as we have seen, all of these elements into man's essential
nature which is known and understood partly through reason and partly through
revelation which always work together. In commenting on the Catholic view
and the ethical position derived from the distinction we have just noted I
Niebuhr writes:
These ultimate requirements of the Christian ethic are not counsels of
perfection or theological virtues of the sort which merely completes an
otherwise incomplete natural goodness or virtue. Nor can they be subtracted from man without making his freedom a source of sinful infection.
They are indeed counsels of perfection in the sense that sinful man lacks
them and is incapable of achieving them But they are basic and not supplementary ~equirements of his freedom. S1
,
From these observations of Niebuhr's attack on the natural law, we can

see that in his own view he is not concerned with distinguishing between
philosophy and theology. Nor does he deny the necessity and validity of the
use of man's rational powers. (We shall consider this pOint more in detail
later.) He only insists that man's reason is limited and tainted both because of
60Niebuhr I Christian Realism and Political Problems, pp. 188-89.
61 Niebuhr, Human Nature po 54
I

0

I

, l

I

I
"

man IS nature as a limited creature and because of the sinful element introduced

.

ip.to that nature by original sin. The role of revelation in his ethics is
,,~

.

primarily one of clarification

0

It enables us to see the nature of man in its

totality. It is important because this would be impossible by simply using
.,~-

man I S limited rational powers.
In summary, we have considered Niebulll-' s views on the nature of man
and the basic norm of morality which is the law of love. In view of the
theological considerations that enter into his general ethical theory, we found
it necessary to consider the role of theology in the construction of his ethics

and conclude that his orien,tation is that of a Christian philosopher. On this
basis, then, we proceed to consider the application of his theory to the sociopolitical situation, in general, and to United States foreign policy, in
particular

0

,,

CHAPTER TIl

•

THE TRANSITION TO SOCIAL ETHICS

.-In 1932, Niebuhr's book, Moral Man and Immoral Society, drew a sharp
distinction, as the title indicates, between the moral behavior of individuals
and that of social groups.1 Since that time he has modified the position indicated in this title but the distinction does, nevertheless, indicate something
of the general nature of his position regarding the difference between individual
and collective morality. Now, as a preliminary to the consideration of the problem of applying the norm of love to social ethics, we must consider this distinction between individual and collective morality as it is viewed by
Niebuhr.
We have already noted that man is related to the community in both
horizontal and vertical dimensions. The horizontal relationship is experienced
whenever his community is in conflict with other communities. In the vertical
dimenSi.on, we see that man looks up to the community which is the fulfillment
of his life and the sustainer of 'his existence. But, he also looks down on the

1 Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932).
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community because he is higher than it for the reason that the community is
bound more inexorably to nature than .he is. 2 It is on this basis primarily that

•

Niebuhr1s position that "as soon as a third person is introduced into the relation
even the most perfect love requires a rational estimate of conflicting needs and
interests ,,3 Thus, in community, the more complex situation necessitates
0

greater difficulties in rising above the demands 'of nature to the full realization
of the ideal of love.
Niebuhr gives a number of characteristics of communities which
account for the increased:difficulty of attaining the moral idea on the collective
level. All of these are in some way the result of the relationship of power to the
community. Consequently, before we consider these characteristics

I

it will be

helpful to consider in some detail in what his notion of power consists and how
it is related to the ethical ideal.
Social power, for Niebuhr, has two aspects which determine the
quality of the order and harmony of a given community and are essential and
perennial aspects of community organization. One is the coercive and organ-

.

izing power of the government; the other is the balance of the vitalities and
forces in any given social situation which is generally referred to as the equ.llibrium or. balance of power. Both of these contain pos sibilities of contradicting
2 Niebullr , Th~.fuill.~ the Dramas of History, pp. 35-38.

3Nieb~hr Human Destiny, p. 2480
I

,
1
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the law of brotherhood~ The former may degenerate into tyranny; the latter into
,'anarchy.

4

But in ordei to understand the relevance of povJer on the collective

•
level, it will be necessary to consider Niebuhr's concept of power in general.
We have already seen that man, because of his finlteness and sin, is
,,-

in a state of insecurit}i and that he seeks to overcome this1!nsecurity by a willto-power. The effect of this will-to-power is 'that it disburbs the harmony of
creation if it is directed improperly. In religious terms, this disturbance is
called sin and its definitive characteristic is pride; 5 in moral and social
terms, it is injustice. The injustice occurs because man strives to overcome
his insecurity by asserting his power in subordinating the lives of others to
his own will

6
0

4Ibid ., pp. 257-58.
5 Cf • Rhoades, .QE.. cit., pp. 3-7. Niebuhr here is attdc:'J'd on
theological grounds for considering pride as the definitive characteristic of
sin as he does in Human Nature (PP. 179, 188). Mr. Rhoades pOints out
that earlier in the same work, Niebuhr cons~ders the primal sin to be unfaith,
distrust, or unbelieving pride. Mr. Rhoades regards this to be more accurate
theologically because sin primarily has to do with man's relation to God. This
criticism seems to coincide with the position taken by Fr. Gustave Weigel,S.J.
in his article entitled "Authority in Theology" which appears in Reinhold
Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, ed. Charles W.
Kegley and Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), pp. 367-78.
6Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp. 178-79.
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Niebuhr then

go~s
j

on to accept Bertrand

Russ~ll' s
~

distinction between
•

!

two forms of the pride of power. 7 Niebuhr writes that in one form "The human
•
ego assumes its self-su,fficiency and self-mastery and imagines itself secure
against all vicissitudes 0,,8 This form is present in some degree in all huma'n
beings but rises to greater heights among those individuals or classes who
possess greater degrees of social power. The other form is "the lust for power
which has pride at its end. 119 At first glance, it seems as though the second
form which we

hav~

just described does rise out of man f s insecurity but that

the first does not. However, Niebuhr pOints out that the distinction is justified
as long as it is regarded as strictly provisional. The individual or group which
possess the first form of the pride of power is always faced with the possibility
of losing that power and thus there is a drive to maintain the secure position.
Thus, "the will-to-power is an expression of insecurity even when it has
achieved ends which, from the perspective of an ordinary mortal, would seem to
guarantee complete security. ,,10
In general, Niebuhr classifies power under two major headings:
spiritual and physical. Spiritual power is further divided into two forms. One
7Bertrand Russell, Power, New Social Analysis (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1948), pp. 15ff.
8,Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 188.
9 Ibid •

10 Ibid ., p. 194.
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bf these is the rational 'wherein reason is the instrument used in advancing the
claims of one individual' against another. It can be either just or unjust depen-

•
ding on how it is used. In the other form of spiritual power, one individual or
group enslaves another through sp'i],itual vitalities such as mental or emotional
energy, the pretension or possession of virtue, the prestige of an heroic life,
or the prestige of a gentle birth. On the practical level, there is always an
admixture of both the spiritual and the physical. 11
Power, for Niebuhr, is not something that is intrinsically evil. His own
words make this clear: "But power cannot be evil of itself, unless life itself be
regarded as evil. For life

~s

power. Life is never pure form or reason. It is

inherently dynamic. Even the purest 'reason' is power. ,,12 His discussion of
power aims at showing the great possibility of injustice that derives from power
since power is frequently sought by the human individual or group as an expression of pride which has its source in human finiteness and insecurity.
Now that we have considered the general nature of power and its place
in Niebuhr's philosophy, we are in a position to consider in greater detail the
reasons which he gives for the increased difficulty of attaining the ideal of love
on a collective basis. We have seen that man's finiteness and sin give rise to
insecurity. This insecurity gives rise to a will-to-power and when this will-to11 Ibid

0

,

pp. 260-61.

12Reinhold Niebuhr, "Power and Justice," Christianity and Society,
VII1, No.1 (Winter, 1942), p. 10.

39
power becomes excessive, it results in a disorder which has the religious
dimension of pride or sin and the moral and social dimension of injustice. In

•
other words, it is a contradiction of the ideal of love. Now, Niebuhr gives two
reasons for distinguishing the disorder (pride) on the individual and collective
.,~-

levels. First, it is necessary because even though group pride has its source
in individual attitudes, it achieves a certain authority over the individual and
because it develops organs of will it seems to become an independent center of
moral life. Second, the distinction is necessary because the pretensions and
claims of the collective unit exceed those of the individual with the result that
the group is more arrogant '. hypocritical, self-centered I and more ruthles s in
the pursuit of its ends. This is true to such an extent that the individual will
frequently seek identification with the group for the purpose of attaining his
more individualistic and selfish ends

13
0

Frequently, it is asserted that the will-to-power of the group is simply
the result of the instinct for survival and" not the result of rational calculation.
The basis for this contention is a view which regards the group as having
developed organs of will but lacking any sort of mind which is the basis for
self-transcendence as well as responsible moral conduct. On this point
Niebuhr counters by admitting that it is true "that the group possesses only an
inchoate 'mind ' and that its organs of self-transcendence and self-criticism
13Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp 0 208-90

.

\
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are very unstable and e~hemeral compared to its organs of will, 1114 but then
goes on to prove that the activity of the group, in general, and the nation, 15

•
in particular, is spiritual (or rational) in character. He writes:
The most conclusive proof that the egotism of nations is a characteristic
of the spiritual life, and not merely an expression of the natural impulse
of survival, is the fact that its most typical expressions are the lust-forpower, pride (comprising considerations of prestige and "honour") , contempt toward the other (the reverse side of pride and its necessary
concomitant in a world in which self-esteem is constantly challenged by
the achievements of others); hypocrisy (the inevitable pretension of conforming to a higher norm than self-interest); and finally the claim of moral
autonomy by which the self-deification of the social group is made explicit
by its presentation of itself as the source and end of existence .16
Some of the expressions of characteristics of the nation which we have

.
just enumerated were listed by Niebuhr in a slightly different fashion in Moral
Man and Immoral Society to indicate the differences between the individual and
collective selves and to account for the increased difficulties in attaining the
ethical ideal on the collective level. Among the other characteristics of the
14 Ibid., p. 21 0 •
15Niebuhr frequently uses the nation as the prime example of a group.
As he puts it: liThe egotism of racial, national and socio-economic groups is
most consistently expressed by the national state because the state gives the
collective impulses of the nation such instruments of power and presents the
imagination with such obvious symbols of its discrete collective identity that
the national state is most able to make absolute claims for itself to enforce
those claims by power, and to give them plauSibility and credibility by the
majesty and panoply of its apparatus. II (Human Nature p. 2090)
I

I

16 Nie buhr, Human Nature, p. 211.

,
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group which make for the greater difficulty about which we

~re

speaking is the

fact that groups can only know the needs of other people at second hand and

•
indirectly

0

Since sympathy and justice depend on a perception of need, there

i$ obviously a greater d~ficulty in... -achieving ethical relationships .17 Also,
e'ven though he insists that there is at least an inchoate "mind" in the group,
it cannot be denied that the group is held together much more by force and
emotion than by mind. This, too, adds to the difficulty of attaining the ethical
ideal. 18 The hypocrisy which was mentioned above is still another characteristic of the nation or group which adds to the difficulty.19 Yet, in spite of the
fact that Niebuhr sees many characteristics of the group which account for the
differences between individual and collective morality, he finds it impossible
to draw any neat line between them because of the nature of the relationship of
the individual and the group or community. 20
Prom the foregoing analysis of the nature of man and the

comrnuni~· 1 i~·t.'"

see eat Xiebunr views r::an on the existential level as basically insecure. His
effort to overcome this insecurity 1s manifested in a will-to-power which can be
17Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral SOCiety, pp. 83-85.
18 Ibid

0,

pp 88-89.
0

19 Ibid., p. 95.
20Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness, p. 48.
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channeled in such a w&,.y as to help him toward the achievetnent of the norm of

. by his essential nature.
.'

4

Jove which is laid

dow~

'

This will-to-power can also

•

be misdirected and result in a disturbance
of the harmony of.
creation and pro.
,
,~

;1

,

,

duce injustice among men. Because the possibility of injustice is greater on
the collective level for the reasons which we have enumerated above, it
follows that the achievement of the ideal of love is harder to attain in the
group situation. Since power lies at the base of man's efforts to achieve this
ideal and also is at the root of his failures in achieving it, Niebuhr concludes:
"The contest of power, then, is the heart of the political life ,,21 Thus, for
0

him, social and political ethics are primarily concerned with the problem of the
balance of power.
We are now faced with the question as to how to achieve t..'lUs
c£

?~'.,..

== so as to e::able collective man to attain his ethical ideal.

words, how does the law of love, which is the the

prili;'~<i ~o W

vI

bc.2a::=~

L'1 other

lli1. elJuhr' S

ethics both on the individual and collective levels, apply to social and
political ethics? We now address ourselves to this question. In spite of the
fact that Niebuhr's close friend and colleague, Dr. John C. Bennett, says,
"It is very difficult to find a clear line connecting this perfect love with

soc~al

ethics, ,,22 we shall attempt to get some idea as to how Niebuhr handles this
21Reinhold Niebuhr, "Leaves from the Notebook of a Warbound
American," The Christian Century, LVI, No. 46 (November IS, 1939, p.140S.,
22Bennett,

.QI?o

cit., p. 57.

,
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problem.
The question of the relation of the law of love to social ethics' is complicated by a problem connected with the law itself

..

0

The type of love that

Niebuhr puts down as the ideal is the sacrificial love which arises out of man's
essential nature and is exemplified in the life of Christ. But just as we noted
that this ideal is a practical impossibility as regards fulfillment in the existential order for an individual, so it is also an existential impossibility for the
community. Niebuhr writes as follows regarding the meaning of the ideal and
the impossibility of attaining it:
In practical terms it m~ans a combination of anarchism and communism
dominated by a spirit of love. Such perfect love as He demands would
obviate the necessity of coercion on the one hand because men would refrain from transgressing upon their neighbor's rights, and on the other
hand because such transgression would be accepted and forgiven if it did
occur. That is anarchism, in other words It would mean communism because the privileges of each would be potentially the privileges of all.
Where love is perfect the distinctions between mine and L1.ine disappear.
The social ideal of Jesus is as perfect and as impossible of attainment as
his personal idea 23
0

0

In spite of this realization, Niebl\hr insists that the ideal remains and must be
applied to the concrete social situation.
Niebuhr points out that the chief indication of the relevancy 01 the
ideal of love to

socio-politica~

ethics is that "there are no limits to be set in

23Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Ethic of Jesus and the Social Problem, "
Religion in Life, I, No.2 (Spring, 1932), po 200.
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history for the achievement of more universal brotherhood, for the development
.
24
'
of more perfect and more inclusive mutual relations. "
In view of the fact
•
that there is this indeterminate .possibility, it seems that there must be some
element which will continually pUJ:"ify the already existing love that exists between and among men

0

Thus, Niebuhr says that "the most direct relationship

of love to the problems of the community would seem to be the purifying effect
of sacrificial love upon mutual love. ,,2 5 liThe law of love, therefore, is not a
norm of history in the sense that historical experience justifies it. Historical
experience justifies more complex social strategies in which the self, individual
and collective, seeks to preserve its life and to relate it harmoniously to other
lives. ,,26 But Niebuhr is quick to point out that the strategies about which he
is talking and the systems of justice which men propose cannot maintain them-

selves without this deeper dimension of the law of love. 27
But, it is argued that the collective self need not conform to a standard
higher than that of prudent self-interest. Yet, the very nature of the community
as Niebuhr sees it, contradicts this contention. The conscience of the individuals within any given community must concern itself with the relation of
24Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 85.
2 5Niebuhr, Faith and History I p. 185.
26Niebuhr, Human Destiny, p. 96.
27 Ibid •

I1
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life within the community to -life outside of it. U it dbes not I the eommunity
itself will be self-defe~ting. 28

•

Now we have seen that '!=he ideal of love is an impossibility on both
the individual and collebtive levels
... -

0

But, we have also seen that in spite of

its impossibility I the ideal of love has relevance for social ethics. The ideal
is necessary because it is derived from the nature of man and the nature of
man's communities. Earlier, we discussed the nature of sacrificial love and its
relation to mutual love and saw the latter as the type of love which exists between and among men and is necessary for individual fulfillment. We noted
that the reciprocal aspect 9annot be the object of any act of love because, if
it were, the act would cease to be love. On this basis, we saw how sacrificial
love and mutual love are related. All that was said in this regard applies to

~

the community situation as well as the individual. But, we must ask wh('th('r
this constitutes the entire picture on the social level.
Dro John C. Bennett thinks "that in Niebuhr's formal analysis of love
there is a missing link as we seek to relate love to social ethics. ,,29 He feels
that this missing link is presupposed in the whole of Niebuhr's thought but
does not find it clearly relate'd to the types of love which Niebuhr empha"sizes.
"Mutual love is the form of love that is closest to social ethics, but this con-

28 Nie buhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, po 235.
29Bennett, ..QE.. ciL I p. 570

\
\
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I

•

Ii

cept does not describe the kind of love which is often present in' connectf.on with
the larger problems of sO¢iety where the element of mutualit}'! is lacking." 30

I,

I

•

Dr. Bennett sees this as a love that has agape in it, but is not pure agape. It

I

consists in "a real caring' for the welfare and dignity of all of our neighbors,

I

even those whom we never see, those who may live as vast multitudes on other

I

continents or those who may actually be opponents or enemies. ,,31 This love
means that we will justice for others and it expresses itself in many different
forms.
Thus far, our analysis has been dealing with the formal aspects of
Niebuhr's social ethics. w.e are now in a position to begin to consider the relation of the ideal of love in terms of material content. In other words

I

we ask

how this law of love is to be applied to the concrete decisions that make up the
everyday life of the community.
Perhaps I the most simple and direct answer to the question that we have
just placed is that the law of love is applied to social ethics by means of the
laws of justice. This does not mean that Niebuhr's position has been altered.
He still holds that "the final law in which all other law is fulfilled is the law
of love. But this law does not abrogate the laws of justice except as love
30 Ibid •
31Ibid., po 58.
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rises above justice to exceed its demands. ,,32 This simply means that on the
practical level, the' aff~irs of the community are to be governed' by the spirit of
justice which spells

ou~

•

particular rights and duties. Love is not to be sub-

stituted for justice in Niebuhr's scheme. Rather, it is the fulfillment and
...

-

highest form of justice. 33 Justice is the highest rational ideal because reason
must deal in terms of ascertainable causes and 'consequences of moral action.
Yet, it must always be remembered that rational justice is related to the law of
love both positively and negatively. The positive relation is that it contains
approximations to the ideal of love. At the same time, there is a negative relation because rational jus.tice constantly seeks to do something less than
justice 34
0

At this point, it will be advantageous to resume our discussion of
Niebuhr's attack on Catholic natural law theory. On the formal level, Niebuhr's

position is clear enough because of his position on the nature of man and his
emphasis on the law of love. On the level of application, however, his position can only be understood in terms of that against which he is primarily
reacting.
32 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Spirit of Justice," Christianity and Society,
XV, No.3 (Summer, 1950), pp. 5-6.

33Ibido
34 Nie buhr, Human Destiny, pp. 248-520

,
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In the last chapter, we saw that Niebuhr criticized the upholders of the
natural law theory for overemphasizing the human reason and for not admitting
•
that original sin had corrupted man1s rational capacity. His other major area
of criticism arises out of what he considers to be undue confidence in human

!
I
(

I

i

reason. This criticism centers around the natural law tendency to find universal

I

propositions under shifting historical conditions and this leads to one of two

I

errors. Natural law proponents either define the primordial or biological as

f

normative as in the birth control issue where Niebuhr feels that "nature" is
defined in purely biological terms or they confuse historically contingent standards with purely natural o.nes. 35
Niebuhr does not feel that the material content of ethics can be drawn
from its formal principle except perhaps in very general terms,. He does allow
for universally valid moral propositions if they are minimal and state something
as broad as that which prohibits murder. 36 But, natural law goes much further.
He feels that "it gives the peculiar conditions and unique circumstances in
.which reason operates in a particular historical moment the sanctity of
universality. ,,37 By way of illustration, he says that "the social ethics of
35Reinhold Niebuhr, itA Protestant Looks at Catholics, ,; The
Commonweal, LVIII, No.5 (May 8, 1953), pp. 117-120.
36 Ibid •
37Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 281.
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Thomas Aquinas embody,. the peculiarities and the contingent factors of a feudal,

agrarian economy into a" system of fixed socio-ethical principles. ,,38

•
This does not m~an, however, that Niebuhr d~nies the necessity and

,
"

'I

I

I

I

validity of human reasorl in determ!ning the material content of social ethics.
We have already seen that he insists upon it. What he objects to is the
canonization of reason to the extent that it is thought that concrete ethical decisions can be made without some defect in them. The place of reason in this'
scheme has been stated by Niebuhr in the following words:
Reason itself is not the source of law, since it is not possible to prove
the selfls obligation to the neighbor by any rational analysis which does
not assume the proposHion it intends to prove Yet reason works helpfully
to define the obli~ation of love in the complexities of various types of
human rela tions. 9
,
0

Repeatedly I Niebuhr has been charged with being a moral relativist by
natural law proponents. Just as repeatedly, he has denied the charge and it
seems that, in many respects, the charge is not one that is justified

0

For, it

might even be said that he upholds a somewhat limited natural law •. We can
let him defend himself in his own' words:
Even if we do not accept the Catholic theory of a highly specific "natural
law" we all do accept principles of justice which transcend the positive
enactments of historic states and which are less speCific and not so
38 Ibid •
39Niebuhr, Faith and History, p.193.

,
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sharp~ define~ as ppsitive law, and yet more specific than the law of
love.,
'

,

(.

'>

;

One analysis of Niebuhr"s ethics sets forth even finer distlnctions in the scale
.

~...

.

of moral relativity. These are based on the overall view of Niebuhr's writings
but are not explicitly spelled out

in anyone place by Niebuhr himself.

"A

complete catalog would appear to include in descending order: the love ideal,
absolute natural law, 'political principles,' positive or civil law, basic social
structures and institutions, and finally the level of naked power conflicts. ,,41
Thus, Niebuhr's attacks on the natural law theory seem to sharpen the
focus on two elements of his own social ethics. The first element is the place
of reason in working out the material content; the second is the emphasis he
places on historical contingencies. Perhaps, i"t would be profitable to discuss
the validity and accuracy of his criticisms of the natural law at this pOint, but

I

it seems better to move on to complete the study of his ethics of United States

foreign policy since our aim is not evaluation of Niebuhr's position but simply
an understanding of his foreign policy ethics

0

In summary, then, we have seen that the social ethics of Niebuhr
follows directly from his concept of the nature of man. Love remains the
primary norm of all human activity. Man's existential condition is basically
40Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 148.
41 Reinhold Niebuhr, Reinhold Niebuhr Q!2 Politics, ed. Harry Ro Davis,
and Robert C. Good (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960), po 166,
I (editors' footnote) •

.
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insecure. From this condition arises a w111-to-power which, if properly used,
,Will assist him in attaining the goal which is laid down for him in the law of

•
love. The resulting state, in tbis case, is one of justice which is the
highest achievement of manls existential
natureo Improper use of power results
.. ,in injustice. The social ethics, therefore, is concerned with balancing power
so as to effect the highest form of justice. It does this by using reason to
apply the law of love to concrete everyday practical decisions. Yet, Niebuhr
is always painfully aware that the deficiencies of human reason and the contingent nature of history make it impossible to achieve perfection in these
decisions. He is also insistent that it is much more difficult to achieve this
justice when we operate on the collective level

0

At the same time he points

out that the community is necessary for the achievement of justice. Now we
can turn to investigat~ the application of his theory in the concrete cases of
United States foreign policy.

,

"

I
1
,CHAPTER IV

.-

WAR
.--

The study of Niebuhr's analysis of United States foreign policy could
be undertaken in several different ways. We could approach it historically by
taking up the various issues as he wrote about them. If our interest were the
interest of an historian or political sCientist, this would probably be the most
fruitful way of proceeding. We could also proceed by selecting those issues
about which Niebuhr wrote the most. This would enable us to see the ethical
issues t.i1at came up but there is still a danger that we would become

mor~

in-

volved in the political aspects rather t;han the philosophical. Since our aim is
a comprehensive view of the ethical aspects of United States foreign policy, it
seems best to proceed by way of analyzing the two major ipeas or categories
into which all of his foreign policy writing can be placed. Consequently, the
present chapter will be devoted to the first of these categories which is war;
the following chapter will take up the second which is peace ~ In this way I we
can best keep our focus on the ethical aspects of his analysis. But, this does
not mean that we intend to ignore the historical or political aspects. We will
consider them at length but always with a view to the accomplishment of our
primary prupose.
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It might be said that Niebuhr's war theory has had tbree stages. In
his early years he was an ardent supporter of the pacifist Position but this was
•
quickly changed and he became one of its most outspoken opponents. Once he
'
\

recognized the validity and necessity of war, his position has not changed
basically although it has undergone development and modification because of
the new problems introduced by the advent of nuclear weapons.
Niebuhr's break with pacifism began when he came to realize that
there is no moral difference between violence and non-violence. He writes:
The differences are pragmatic rather than intrinsic The social consequences of the two methods are different, but the differences are in degree
rather than in kind. Both place restraint upon liberty and both may destroy
life and property. Once the principle of coercion and resistance has been
accepted as necessary to the social struggle and to social cohesion, and
pure pacifism has thus been abandoned, the differences between violence
and non-violence lose their absolute significance, though they remain
important. 1
0

The importance of the distinction to which Niebuhr refers at the end of the
passage just quoted is that he regards social violence as a great evil which
ought to be avoided if at all possible because of the potential destruction involvedo 2
In discussing Niebuhr's thought on the pacifist issue, Dr. John C.
1 Reinhold Niebuhr, "ls Peace or Justice the Goal?" The World
Tomorrow, )N, No. 10 (September 21, 1932), ppo 276-77 ..
2Reinhold Niebuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics, (New York:
Harper and Bros., 1935), PP. 188-89.

I
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Bennett points out that ~iebuhr' s mind changed "only as the iB:ctual alternatives
in the world became 'Umi~ed to surrender to the expandIng totalitarianism on the

•
one hand and violent resistance ,by nations resulting in war on the other. 113
Niebuhr criticized the pacifists beQ.ause they tried to apply the personal ethic
,

!

~

ot sacrificial love to the~ social problem of war

0

The moral i'ssues of war re-

quire a different ethic because the issue is whether or not to accept suffering
by others as the victims of injustice and aggression.
Shortly before World War II, Niebuhr was largely instrumental in
founding the magazine, Christianity and Crisis, which was intended to counteract the pacifist trend in the various religious sects. It is a very interesting and
profitable study to trace his thought on this pacifist issue as it is unfolded in a
large number of articles in this magazine.

Although it is impossible to conside

these articles in great detail, we can uncover the general aspects of his
thought on the pacifist issue by means of a general study of them.
In the very first issue, Niebuhr1s general viewpoint was stated. He
insists that there are historic situations in which the refusal to defend the inheritance of a civilization, even though it is very imperfect, against aggression
may result in unjust consequences much worse than war. 4 He then goes on
to criticize the "perfectionists II on two pOints. They are wrong in their

3Bennett,.QQ.. cito, p. 66.
4Reinhold Niebuhr, liThe Christian Faith and the World Crisis, ..
Christianity and Crisis, I, No.1 (February 10,1941), p. 4.

,,
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failure to distinguish between individual and social ethics which results in
"tIleir desire to establish a political policy of submission to injustice with the
•
further result that the lives and interests of others are defrauded or destroyed.
They are wrong also because they feel
that there is no right or obligation to de,.,fend an imperfect political system. 5
Later in the same year after the United States had placed economic
sanctions on Japan, Niebuhr pOinted out that the sanctions would be useless
unless the Japanese realized that the United States would go to war if
necessary. If this were not the case, then all that the Japanese would have to
do to eliminate the sanctioI').s would be to threaten a violent reaction. Thus,
there is no possibility of drawing an absolute line between violent and nonviolent action. 6
We have already seen a theme which Niebuhr constantly reiterates
when he shows that the alternatives that we have are either gOing to war or
succumbing to a Nazi victory. His conclusion, of course, is that the obligation to seek after the highest possible degree of justice demands that we choose
the former alternative. But, he carries this even further when he sets up a
pair of hypothetical cases and comments on their moral value. The first of
5Ibid.
6Reinhold Niebuhr I "Japan and Economic Sanctions I
and Crisis, I, No o 15 (August 25,1941)' p. 2.
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these is the case of tho"~e who say that it is better to choo~e enslavement
without death and destnlction whel) the odds of success are, slight. The second

-,

is the case of those who say that at a time when the odds of succesS are
minimal, it is still better to risk death and destruction in pursuit of a victory
even though enslavement may result anyway. Niebuhr places such importance
on the avoidance of enslavement and the resulting higher degree of justice that
he says that the second of these alternatives would be the better moral decision
even if the first would be a better decision from a strictly political or strategical point of view. 7

I
t

Niebuhr's views on the morality of war become much more clear when
viewed in the light of his comments on the Neutrality Act of 1939. He goes so
far as to say that this "is one of the most immoral laws that was ever spread
upon a federal statute book.,,8 Niebuhr feels that the immorality of this law was
heightened because a great deal of misguided idealism was evoked in its
support. The remainder of the article is devoted to the task of setting down
some general notions on the differences between, morality and immorality. He
describes the essence of immorality as "the evasion or denial of moral respon7Reinhold Niebuhr, "Reflections on the World Situation," Christianity
and Crisis, I, No.6 (April 21, 1941), po 2.
8Reinhold Niebuhr, "Repeal the Neutrality Act," Christianity and
Crisis, I, No. 18 (October 20, 1941), p. 1.
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sibility 0,,9 The immorcH man, therefore, 1s one who "refuses to recognize his
obligations as a memb~r of a community" and who "isolate~ himself from the'
affairs of his community and acts as a completely unrela;ed individual. ,,10
"Morality,

on the other hand, "consists in the recognition
of interdependence
,
,
of personal life ,,11 A~ opposed to the immoral man, lithe moral man is the man
II

0

'who acts responsibly in relation to his fellows', who knows the duties that
communal life requires

I

and who is willing to accept the consequences which

these duties impose. ,,12 Here, we see the application, in practical terms., of
the concept of the nature of the human self and his relation to the community.
This examination of Niebuhr's attacks on pacifism shows us that his

I
!
~

practical views are both an embodiment and a clarification of his general ethical theory. We see, as we have just noted, his concept of the nature of man
and the community

0

The distinction between individual and collective morality

is clarified in terms of the obligations one has toward others when making
decisions that affect the group. His insistence on the defense of less-thanperfect political systems echoes' his comments on the existential nature of
man and his communities which contain only approximations of the ideal of
9 Ibido

10Ibid.
11 Ibid .
12Ibid.
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love. The necessity of ¢hoosing between alternatives that a:re only relatively
;

perfect embodies his assertions regarding the relational character of justice •

•
Finally, the total picture is an example of the way in which reason operates in
Niebuhr's system to apply the ethical ideal by means of achieving a balance of
,

.<, ...

power.
Another element is added to the war theory as we begin to consider the
problem of the just war in the nuclear age. Here we see how Niebuhr adapts
to the new problems presented as a result of the contingent nature of history.
His theory on nuclear war develops only gradually and illustrates his aspect of
Niebuhr's general ethical tl)eory as well as his approach to the new problems
of social ethics.
The problem first begins to present itself when the question of obliteration bombing comes up. In March, 1944, he writes in the editorial section of
Christianity and Crisis that obliteration bombing would seem to exceed the
limits of total war .13 Since he invites readers' comments on this issue, it
would seem that at this time he did not have a definite opinion on the matter.
A few weeks later, he wrote that the bombing question should remain under
scrutiny because of the tendency of the military mind to ignore moral and
political factors in determining strategy. He pOints out that the change of
13Reinhold Niebuhr I "Editorial Notes I
No.4 (March 20 I 1944) I p. 2 •.

II

Christianity and Crisis I IV I

,
l

,
policy from precision bombing to obliteration

bomb~ng

came about unexpectedly

without an explanation of the reasons behind it. And, he goes on to suggest
that we are not employing all

~e

•

moral and political forces at our disposal to

,

aid us in achieving victory.14 In the following issue, he again editorializes
on the problem and says that it seems that a line can be drawn in terms of
military necessity but that this necessity is extremely difficu..t to define. At
the same time, he suggests that the lack of a satisfactory political reconstruction program increases the military necessity of physical destruction .15
Over a year later, he takes up the atomic issue and offers two alternatives as possible solutions; to the problem. The first of these would be to outlaw the bomb but he rules this out as impractical for several reasons.
Historically, the outlawing of particular instruments of conflict has been unsuccessful. Moreover , such a policy would only engender mistrust. Then
there would also be the problem that it would be ·impossible to put the nations
who have the bomb and those who do not on an equal footing. Finally, this
system would only guarantee

non~use

at the beginning of any war. The other

alternative is an international organization .and he does not find this wholly
satisfactory either because the bipolar arrangement of nations would make the
14Reinhold Niebuhr, "Is the Bombing Necessary? II Christianity and
Crisis, IV, No.5 (April 3, 1944), pp. 1-2.
15Reinhold Niebuhr "Editorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis, IV,
No.6 (April 17 ,1944), p. 2.

,
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organization virtually ineffective. Then he sets down a general norm which
states that the policy should be so directed that it would overcome rather than

...
aggravate mutual fear and mis'trq,st .16 :
Niebuhr finds it impossible to come to any easy or clear-cut solution
..

--

to the nuclear problemo iHe fully recognizes the importance lof the problem because of the possibility of incalculable destruction. He insists that the notion
that the excessive violence that would result from nuclear war has ended the
possibility of a just war is unrealistic and that the moral problem is altered
but not eliminated. He says that lithe development of atomic weapons has
heightened the moral dilemmas which periodically generate the pacifist revolt
against responsibilities which embody moral ambiguities. ,,17 But he will not
. concede that it has solved them.
He rej ects the pacifists who offer the solution which is urging the
renunciation of atomic weapons because the solution they offer oversimplifies
the problem

0

These pacifists would hope that the enemy would go along with a

plan for renunciation but they are willing to do it alone if necessary. Of course
Niebuhr is unhappy with this not only because we do not have access to the
will of the enemy and therefore would not know whether they did go along with .

16Reinhbld Niebuhr, "The Atomic Issue," Christianity and Crisis,
V, No. 17 (October 15, 1945), pp. 5-7.
17 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Hydrogen Bomb and Moral Responsibility,
The Messenger, XIX, No.9 (May 4, 1954), p. 50
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it or not but also because a responsible state,man Qannot put h:!'$ nation in
~

.

such a position· of defenJelessness
even if such a course of ;iaction is permitted
,
.
,i

,

•

'

to an individual and might even pe the more virtuous thing id the latter case .18
Niebuhr rules out the possibility
of mutual disarmament as a solution to
.,;the problem because of the impossibility of devising adequate inspection
systems and the exceptional risk involved in such an undertaking. He writes:
For nuclear disarmament, even if undertaken mutually I involvs some risk
to the securities of both sides There is small prospect that either side
would be willing to take the risks. This remains true even if their failure
to do so would involve the world in the continued peril of nuclear warfare .19
0

Here the proposed solution is ruled out both on the practical and moral levels.
•

", .:j "

Niebuhr also considers the proposal. that there can be limited wars in
the nuclear age even with the use of nuclear weapons

0

Although time seems to

be answering the difficulty raised in his obj ection, it should be noted that he
raised the doubt that tactical atomic weapons could be useful instruments in
such limited wars

20
0

Niebuhr's solution to the nuclear problem does not seem to appear. He
is unwilling to admit that all war in the nuclear age should be outlawed because

'iN I

18Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Hydrogen Bomb," Christianity and Society I
No.2 (Spring, 1950) I pp. 5-7.

19Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires, (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. 269.
20Ibid., p. 280.
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of the horrible consequences that might result. He cannot see the practical
possibility of preventin~ war by means of disarmament • Nor does he see that

•
the possibility of limited wars is a practical solution. He would encourage
more positive effort to avoid all sy-ph wars and remains open to the new developments of science and political and military strategy before coming to an
ultimate solution.
There is still another aspect of Niebuhr's war theory which has been
implicit in the foregoing but demands clarification and emphasis here. Although
he is insistent upon the moral necessity and validity of war for the purpose of
the attainment of the highe.st possible justice, he is at the same time insistent
that war must not be extended beyond that pOint which is necessary for the
attainment of this goalo A case in pOint is the controversy between President
Truman and General MacArthur during the Korean War. Niebuhr felt that
President Truman's action in removing MacArthur when the latter wanted to extend the war was not only justified but also the only morally 'correct alternative
even if MacArthur's plan might have been better politically and militarily. But
Niebuhr even felt that President Truman's decision had good effects politically
as is indicate4 when he wrote that "the dismissal of MacArthur without 'a
serious political crisis not only reassured our European friends about the sanity
of our foreign policy but also about the stability of our democratic institu-

.
I
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tions ... 21
In summary, "then, we have seen that Niebuhr's general ethical theory
readily finds application as well as clarification in his evaluation of the
various aspects of war. This war""1:Peory comprises a substantial port i' "
foreign policy ethics. His aim is to show how the balance of power is designed
to produce the highest form of justice which is the existential embodiment of
the ideal of love. The balance notion is brought out best if we contrast his
efforts to combat pacifism with his comments on the virtues of limiting the war
in Korea. He also wants to make clear that there is a sharp distinction between
individual and collective morality. This distinction was not quite so pronounced when we were dealing on the theoretical level, but it becomes more
apparent as we consider the practical aspects of Niebuhr's ethics. Finally,
we have seen the place of reason and historical contingencies and the role that
they play in the working out of the concrete practical decisions of social
ethics. Now that we have considered the major aspects of Niebuhr's views on"
war, we can turn to the question" of peace to round out our view of Niebuhr's
foreign policy ethics.

21 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Peril of War and the Prospects of Peace, "
Christianity and Crisis, XI, No. 17 (October 15,1951), p. 129.

CHAPTER V

•
PEACE
From what we have already seen of Niebuhr's concept of collective
morality, we are not surprised that he is continually calling our attention to
the fact that moral problems become more serious and more complex as the community becomes larger. As a result, he views the moral issues in international
relations as much more difficult than any others in the entire political realm.
It is no wonder, then, that.he was quite critical of Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles for what Niebuhr viewed as an oversimplified approach to the
moral problems of international affairs

0

The views of Mr. Dulles on the Com-

munists are a case in point. Niebuhr's criticism can be summed up in his own
words as follows: "Mr Dulles' moral universe made everything quite clear,
0

too clear, with the result that it complicated our relations with our allies, who
found our self-righteousness very vexatious III This same criticism about an
0

oversimplified approach to the moral problems of international affairs was also
a consistent theme in his writings on the Suez crisis in 195·6.
1Reinhold Niebuhr, liThe Moral World of Foster Dulles, " The New
Republic, CXXXIX, No.2 (December I, 1958), p. 8.
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At the base of theiproblem of the ethios of foreign policy is the question
about the extent to whicn'the policy should be governed by self-concern on the

•

one hand and altruism on the other. Niebuhr tells us that it is not easy for a
nation to be concerned with other nations in altruistic terms ,,i He cautions that
"a nation that is too preoccupied with its own interests is bound to define those
interests too narrowly • • • because it will fail to consider those of its
interests' which are bound .!ill. in .2.. web of mutual interests with other nations ,,2
0

Niebuhr suggests two things in connection with this problem. First, he does
not ask that any nation abandon self-concern altogether but insists that nations
must realize that what is good for the alliance of free nations is for the ultimate
good of any individual nation also. But this is not enough. Thus, the second
requirement is that the citizens of a nation must have loyalties and responsibilities to a wider system of values than the national interest. 3
The possession of great power carries with it the responsibility of
using that power to effect the greatest degree of social justice. Niebuhr,
therefore, is constantly insisting that the United States I because of its position
of power, must employ every means to use its power in a responsible manner.
He indicates that there are two ways in which we can deny our responsibilities
to our fellow men. The first is by way of imperialism wherein we seek to

2Reinhold Niebuhr, IIOur Moral and Spiritual Resources for International
Cooperation," Social Action, XXII, No.2 (February, 1956), p. 180
3Ibido, ppo 18-19,0

,
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1

dominate them by our po~er. The second is by way of isolationism wherein

Wi:;

attempt to withdraw from our responsibilities toward them. 4 . He points out'
)

,

.

:

that the isolationist tendencies 9f the United States stem from the fact that
until just recently she was far removed
physically from the rest of the world
.. ,

with the result that she did not feel her responsibility" But, he insists that
the United States must realize its obligation toward the rest of the world and
therefore manipulate its power for the good of mankind. 5
We can see what Niebuhr is talking about here by considering its embodiment in actual foreign policy instruments and situations. The duty of
helping other nations whic!} are enslaved was the subject of an article in
Christianity and Crisis in 1943 wherein Niebuhr urged both material help and
the defeat of the tyranny which was holding them in slavery. He said that
there is a duty to love without looking for a return. 6 He had written in a
similar way the year before and had also included another aspect when he said
that we must be mindful of the positive aspect of the reconstruction of a world
order in addition to the negative aspect of defeating the enemy.

7

Other aspects

4Reinhold Niebuhr, The Irony of American History, (New York:
Charles Scribner'.s Sons, 1952), po 36.
5Reinhold Niebuhr, "American Power and World Responsibility, "
Christianity and Crisis, III, Noo 5 (AprilS, 1943), po 40
6Reinhold Niebuhr, "America and the Enslaved Nations," Christiunity
and Crisis, I, No o 17 (October 6, 1941), pp. 1-20
7 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Our Responsibilities in 1942," Christianity and
GU!31.§,I, No. 24 (January 12, 1942), pp. 1-2.
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of his theory regarding American responsibility appeared about the same time.
These include such fundamental notions as the abandonment of the principle of
•

unlimited national

sover~ignty,

economic reconstruction, ,and the placing of

limitations on victors as well as on_ the vanquished. 8
The fact that Niebuhr praised the Marshall Plan to such an extent that
he called it "a kind of turning pOint in postwar history,,9 prompts us to consider
this plan in some detail

0

In order to do this, it will be necessary to consider

the details of this plan in the context of the larger program of American foreign
policy of which it was the most significant part.
During the period fr?m 1946 until 1950, United States foreign policy
developed in four major steps: the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the
North Atlantic Treaty (NATO), and the Point Pour Program. These were programs
which worked out the details of a general concept which formed the basis of
American policy. The general orientation of the program consisted in the acceptance of the concept of bipolarity. The United States policy was that of
containment which was spelled out in detail in an article in Foreign Affairs in

8Reinhold Niebuhr, "Allied Peace Claims, " Christianity and Crisis,
I, No. 11 (June 30, 1941), p. 2.
9Reinhold Niebuhr, IIEditorial Notes," Christianity and Crisis « VII,
No. 14 (August 4, 1947), p. 2.
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1947.

10

This was a poU6y
, in which the United States committed itself to con-

taining
Soviet power'
by cZounterforce at a number of shifting geographical
and
:
.
i
•
political points which would be determined according to the shifts in Soviet
policy. The result would be frustration which would work at the weaknesses
,,-

'

in the Soviet system.
In 1947 t a civil war was being carried on in Greece in which the
Communists were trying to overthrow the popularly elected government that was
being sustained economically by Great Britain. At the same time, the Soviets
were attempting to gain a free hand in the Turkish Straits
were receiving economic

a~d

The Turks, too t

0

military assistance from the British. Early in that

same year I Great Britain advised the United States that she would discontinue
aid after three months. President Truman decided that the United States should
take over the role of Great Britain in order to show its interest in the policy of
containment. This was to be done primarily by economic assistance. The
policy came to be known as the Truman Doctrine

0

.

In June, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall proposed a scheme
which was later to become known as the Marshall Plan. His proposal suggested that the countries of Europe plan their economic recovery in common.
He assured them that those countries who were willing to cooperate would
10 By X, liThe Sources of Soviet Conduct, " Foreign Affairs, )ON,
(July I 1947), pp. 566-82. (It was later disclosed that the author of this
article was George F. Kennan.)
,

\
\
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r~ceive

help and encouragement from the United States. Thf# pu,rpose of the

plan was to provide political assistance to the countries
that wanted it for the
.
•
purpose of fighting against hung,er and poverty so that conditions might be
~

created wherein free institutions could exist

0

Thus, the Marshall Plan went

beyond the Truman Doctrine in that it was offering political assistance and not
merely economic aid.
At the end of August, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was
formed for the purpose of maintaining and developing the individual and
collective capacity of the signing nations to resist armed attack. It was
agreed that all the member .nations would look upon an armed attack against one
as an attack against all. The prime NATO principle was that military establishments should be rebuilt in order to defend the reconstructed economies

0

Now I

United States aid had been extended to include economic, political and
military assistance.
When President Truman was inaugurated in 1949, the Point Pour proposal was explicated in his inaugural address. He stated that the lines of
United States foreign policy were to support the United Nations', to give
economic assistance to strengthen the free world, to provide military assistance
for the same purpose, and finally to inaugurate a program for the development of
the underdeveloped countries. The motivation behind this proposal was twofold

0

It was looked upon as an humanitarian program but was also designed

,
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to bring a larger number of countries into the sphere of influence of the United
States .11
Niebuhr's

enthus~asm

..
about the .Matshall Plan is not surprising when

we
consider that in 1943 he wrote as
.
- follows concerning the role of America
after the war: "America could function in the interest of democracy only if it
were ready to give economic support to the continent without seeking to prevent the establishment of systems which sought to combine collective forms of
economy with political freedom. ,,12 His comments on the motivation that
prompted the plan bring into focus the tension between self-concern and
altruism about which we SP9ke earlier 0 Here we have the concrete embodiment
of what we considered before in more theoretical terms. He remarks that both
~

the national interest and the needs of others were served by this effort of the
United States. In his own words: "In it prudent self-interest was united with
concern for others in a fashiOn which represents the most attainable virtue of
nations. ,,13 The Marshall Plan, for Niebuhr, was especially significant be-

11This summary of foreign policy from 1946 to 1950 is based on:
William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United
States Foreign Policy 1945-1955, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1956), pp. 104-40.

~
12Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Peril of Our Foreign Policy I" Christianity
. a~d SOCiety, VIII, No.2 (Spring, 1943), p. 200
13Reinhold Niebuhr, "Hybris, II Christianity and Society XVI, No
(Spring, 1951), p. 4.
I

\

,
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cause it furthered the policy begun with the Truman Doctrine and achieved what
the Truman Doctrine' could not achieve by itself .14 .

•

As for the North Atlantic ,Treaty, Niebuhr was almost as pleased. He
looked upon it as the logical

caps,~9ne

of the policy which had been developing

during the period from 1946 to 1950. It was an indication of the willingness of
the United States to assume its responsibility toward the world community and
a recognition of the responsibility that it had for leadership among the free
nations of the Westo As a part of the overall policy of containment, it was the
other side of the strategy which was at the base of the Marshall Plan .15
We might legitimately ask why Nuebuhr was so much in favor of the
United States I policies during this period when in each of the instances mentioned above she acted independently of the United Nations. A complete
answer will be implicit in the examination of his views on world organization
which we will take up later. But the answer can be given in somewhat general
terms at this point. Basically, the reason would be found in his article, "The
Myth of World Government, ,,16 where he points out that the constitutional
setup of a state does not create a community. Rather the community itself

14Reinhold Niebuhr, "Editorial Notes,
VII, No. 13 (July 21, 1947), p. 2.

II

Christianity and Crisis,

lSReinhold Niebuhr, "The North Atlantic Pact," Christianity and
Crisis, IX, No.9 (May 30, 1949), pp. 65-66.
16ReinhQld Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government, " The Nation, . \
CLXII, No. 11 (March 16, 1946), pp. 312-14 •
.
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must first exist and then the constitution can perfect it and give it more
stability. The policies

o~

this period were of such a nature that they were
•
able to create a type of community on the international level. As the sense of
community developed, new constitut.ional developments appeared.
In this
.
.'

light; these policies would not be such as to be destructive of the United
Nations but would ultimately foster its growth an'd stability.
Before we proceed to take up the question of world organization, it
will be profitable to pause briefly for purposes of orientation. In general, it
might be said that there are three themes which permeate Niebuhr's writings
concerning United States foreign policy and its relation toward peace during
the war and post-war years. The first of these is the responsibility of the
United States to assume leadership in the world community. The second has to
do with the necessity of international cooperation. The third and final theme
handles the question of international organization.
We have already seen what Niebuhr means when he speaks of the
responsibility of the United States to assume leadership in the world community
This became clear both in the discussion on power and responsibility and in
his comments on the specific aspects of the policy of containment which
dominated the scene during the early post-war years

0

This was a theme that

was occupying his time even before the United States entered World War II. In
an article in Christianity and Crisis, he stated that it was impossible to

'.
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determine exactly what course would be followed after: the war but he was
~ertain

problem~

would be solved only if the llTnited'States would be
•
willing to assume some measure, of responsibility for the world order. I7 This
that the

,

responsibility will be seen in a

dif.~erent

light as we take up the question of

international organization.
The second theme has also made up a part of the topics which we have
been considering. During the years of World War II, Niebuhr was constantly
stressing the importance of international cooperation. His satisfaction with
the United States foreign policy program in the post-war years can be partially
attributed to the fact that it fostered cooperation among nations. As we take up
the consideration of international organization we will see that cooperation on
various levels is a necessary prerequisite of any world

g~vernment.

If we consider the nature of man as found in Niebuhr, his concept of

the interrelatedness of men, and the notions of his social ethics which call for
the balancing of power and interests, we can logically proj ect that world
government is a longed-for ideal ~ But, as Niebuhr himself points out, the
problem of world government can be approached from two different, but not
necessarily opposite, viewpoints. One is the viewpoint of historical realism;
the other is that of rationplist idealism. Niebuhr says that the task of world
organization should be approached from the standpoint of historical realism but
17 Reinhold Niebuhr I liThe World After the War,
Crisis l I, No.1 (February 10, 1941), p. 3.
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then qualifies this statement by pointing to the contributions that can be made
by idealism 018

•
In general, Niebuhr regards the utopian ideal of world government as a
fallacy. This does hot mean that he is opposed to it or does not hold it up as
an eventual ideal. He simply insists that "we do not have one world, or any
hope of achieving it in the proximate future 0,,19 . The fallacy, he tells us, can
be set down in two propositions. First, governments are not created by fiat.
Second governments have only limited efficacy in integrating a community. 20
f

The proposition that governments are created by fiat which consists of
legal and constitutional enactments is unrealistic because it fails to take into
account the lessons of history. 21 An historical example of this attempt is the
social contract concept which has been present in

politic~l

thought since the

time of Hobbes. 22 Niebuhr admits that it is true that the United States was established by the fiat of the social contract, but hastens to point out that the
18Reinhold Niebuhr, "Plans for World Reorganization," Christianity and
Crisis, II, No. 17 (October 19,1942), pp. 3-60
19Reinhold Niebuhr, "One World or None," Christianity and Crisis,
VIII, No.2 (February 16, 1948), po 9.
2 oNiebuhr , Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 17.
21Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government, " QQ.. cit., p. 312.
22Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, p. 18.
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community which made up the United States preceded the constitutional fiat.
This community was established by such integrating factors as the fear of a

•
common enemy, the shared experience of the battlefield, a similar culture, and
so forth. Thus, the Constitution es_tablished "a more perfect union" where
union already existed. 2 3
The second proposition shows a misconception of the relationship of
government to community 0 "Governments cannot create communities for the
simple reason that the authority of government is not primarily the authority
of law nor the authority of force, but the authority of the community Itself. ,,24
The real relation of government and community has been described by Niebuhr
as follows:
The fact is that governments presuppose community and in turn perfect
it; but they cannot create it. Communities are created by more organic.
processes than the fiat of a constitution. They rest upon mutual trust and
other forces of cohesion such asa common language and culture, common
traditions and common concepts of law and morals. The international community lacks all these forms of cohesion. 25
Thus, the international community demands certain organic forces of cohesion.
Primary among these are forces which Niebuhr calls "social tissue 0"

23Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government,".Ql2.. cito, p. 313.
24Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, po 220
25Reinhold Niebuhr, "World Community and World Government, "
Christia~ityand Crisis, VI, Noo 3 (March 4, 194a, p.5.'
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Niebuhr sees that there is a degree of social tissue in the international
community but it is minimal in comparison with that of existing national states •

•
National communities have a common ethnic background I language I geography I
and history but these elements are not present in the international community .26
In fact, there is little to create the consciousness of "we" with the possible
exception of three factors which Niebuhr enumerates. The first is the increasing economic interdependence of the people of the world but this should
be contrasted with the wide disparity in the economic strength of various
nations. 27 The second factor is the fear of mutual destruction but Niebuhr
pOints out that "there is no record in history of peoples establishing a common
community because they feared each other I though there are many instances
where the fear of a common foe acted as the cement of cohesion. ,,28 Finally,
the most important factor is the moral sense of

ob1i~ation

that men of all

nations have toward their fellow men who live beyond the limits of their
national states. 29
Niebuhr feels that the United States is generally guilty of approaching

2 6Niebuhr I "The Myth of World Government, " .QJ2.. cit ... , p. 313.
27Niebuhr, Christian Realism and Political Problems, po 27.
28Ibid., p. 28. Cf. also: "The Myth of World Government, " ..9..2.. cH.,
p. 313 Here Niebuhr gives the present bipolar setup of nations as an example
of the fear of a common enemy acting as a force of cohesion.
0

29 Ibid •

I
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the question of international organization from an ideaUstic viewpoint rather
then
that of historical realism.
He writes:
.
-

•
What makes American proposals for ideal constitutional solutions particularly vexatious is that we present them to the world even while we prove in
our day-to-day politlC5 that ~e are only beginners in the lessons of international mutuality. We are for world government until it is decided that
its headquarters are :to be near our ancestral home. We ,:are for world
government, but we think the British loan a~reement is too generous,
proving thereby how little we understand the problems of a very wealthy
nation I s relation to an impoverished world. 30
And elsewhere, he says that "it would be intolerable if we again presented the
world with a case of American schizophrenia, allowing our idealists to dream
i
up pure answers for different problems while our cynics make our name odious
by the irresponsible exercise of our power ... 31
In spite of the sharp criticisms of the American proposals which we have
just seen, Niebuhr does see the United States in an important position in relation to the growth of the international community. There is, Niebuhr feels,
another organiC factor (over and above the forms of social tissue described
above) that is serving to integrate the free world. This is the power and
authority of the United States as she has emerged as a leader among nations
because of her Willingness to accept the responsibility thrust upon her as a
result of a number of historical accidents. She has done this through a foreign
30Niebuhr, "World Community and World Government,".Q.£. cit.,
po 6.

31Niebuhr, "The Myth of World Government,".Q.£. cit., p. 314.
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policy such as we saw sl1-e adopted during the post-war years. But he pOints
out that this position of power is both valuable, for the unity of the world while
•
at the same time being dangerom) to justice. 32
Here I we have seen Niebuhr's
theory of the nature of- man and com... munity as it is developed in terms of practical political decisions

0

These de-

cisions are not such that they should be able, in themselves, to provide
answers for the problems that will arise in the future. This would be contrary
to Niebuhr's fundamental concepts of social ethics which places heavy emphasis
on the contingencies of history. As for the more general norms which can be
found in Niebuhr's social ethics I it can be safely said that they could be of
value for future generations. But, it would seem that Niebuhr would feel that
the aim of his writings on the ethics of specific political issues has been accomplished if subsequent generations would see a method for applying a
general concept of the nature of man and community to the unique problems of
the time in which they occur.

32Niebuhr, The Self and the Dramas of History, pp. 206-7.
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